





Abstract	 According	 to	 Ian	 Hacking’s	 Entity	 Realism,	 unobservable	 entities	 that	 scientists	 carefully	
manipulate	 to	 study	other	phenomena	 are	 real.	Although	Hacking	presents	his	 case	 in	 an	 intuitive,	
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1. Introduction	
Ian	Hacking’s	Entity	Realism	(ER)	 is	an	 influential	position	within	 the	Scientific	Realism	(SR)	
debate.	According	to	ER,	unobservable	entities	that	scientists	carefully	manipulate	to	study	other	
phenomena,	 such	 as	 electrons	 that	 physicists	 spray	 from	an	 electron	 gun,	 are	 real.	 Although	
Hacking	presents	his	case	in	an	intuitive,	attractive,	and	persuasive	way,	his	argument	for	ER	

















five	different	 interpretations,	 and	 the	 last	 section	examines	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	different	
arguments	can	work	together	making	a	robust	case	for	ER.		
2. ER	within	SR	
Roughly,	 SR	 states	 that	 science	 aims	 at	 discovering	 the	 truth	 about	 nature,	 and	 succeeds	 in	






(S1)		 Scientific	 claims,	 particularly	 about	 unobservables,	 should	 be	 taken	 at	


















which	 denies	 a	 natural	 grouping	 of	 the	 world	 into	 essences	 or	 kinds.	 (S1)	 rejects	 logical	
empiricists’	 and	 classic	 instrumentalists’	 view	 that	 observable	 terms	are	mere	 shorthand	 for	
describing	observable	phenomena.	(S2)	states	a	non‐epistemic	theory	of	truth.	It	is	contrasted	





truth,	 and	 shoulder	 the	 burden	 of	 correspondence	 in	 other	 places,	 such	 as	 one’s	 theory	 of	
reference,	or	a	theory	of	truth‐making.3	(E1)	is	contrasted	with	constructive	empiricists’	view	
that	 the	 aim	 of	 science	 is	 empirical	 adequacy,	 i.e.,	 attaining	 the	 truth	 only	 about	 observable	







of	 science	 a	miracle”.	 NMA	 ties	 together	 empirical	 success,	 reference	 of	 theoretical	 terms	 to	
unobservable	entities,	and	truth.	NMA	is	an	inference	to	the	best	explanation	(IBE).	Under	the	
IBE	 model,	 we	 legitimately	 infer	 the	 truth	 of	 our	 best	 explanation	 of	 some	 given	 facts.	
Explanatory	merits	 such	 as	 simplicity	 and	 scope	determine	which	 explanations	 are	 the	best.	
Explanatory	 considerations	 determine	 plausibility,	 so	 the	 best	 explanation	 is	 the	 likeliest	
                                                 
3	I	thank	Anjan	Chakravartty	and	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	this	clarification.	
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from	 the	 history	 of	 science	 which	 were	 empirically	 successful	 yet	 false	 and	 contained	 non‐
referring	terms.	One	way	to	construct	Laudan’s	PI	is	as	an	enumerative	induction:		



























fact	 of	 their	 existence,	 Hacking	 (1983,	 265)	 argues	 that	 we	 can	 know	 a	 modest	 number	 of	
“home	 truths”	 about	 experimental	 entities,	 which	 consist	 of	 thinly	 theory‐laden	 low‐level	
generalizations	about	their	well	understood	causal	properties;	for	example,	their	mass,	spin,	and	
charge.	 Hacking	 contrasts	 these	 low‐level	 generalizations	 or	 “home	 truths”	 with	 full‐blown	
scientific	theories	about	unobservables,	which	are	not	belief‐worthy.			
ER	in	not	an	innocent	doctrine.	It	significantly	narrows	the	scope	of	SR.	While	ER	leaves	




In	 sum,	Hacking’s	ER	draws	a	 clear	 distinction	between	observable	and	experimental	




than	 structural.	 I	 distinguish	 argument	 types	 based	 on	 the	 type	 of	 epistemic	 warrant	 the	








we	 legitimately	 infer	 the	 truth	 of	 our	 best	 explanation	 of	 some	 given	 facts.	 But	why	 are	we	
entitled	to	treat	explanatory	merits	as	likeliness	indicators?	There	are	various	possible	answers	





from	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 fingerprints	 were	 found	 in	 the	 crime	 scene,	 a	 person	 matching	 her	
description	was	seen	fleeing	the	crime	scene,	etc.,	this	inference	reflects	the	court’s	knowledge	
of	how	crimes	are	usually	committed.	Generally	speaking,	we	observe	regularities,	see	that	some	
events	 are	 more	 frequent	 than	 others,	 and	 develop	 our	 explanatory	 merits	 based	 on	 these	
observations	(Ben‐Menahem	1990;	Day	&	Kincaid	1994).	














entities	 to	study	other	phenomena	 is	much	more	 impressive	 than	previous	







very	 sensible	…	 a	 century	 ago.	 Anti‐realism	 about	any	 sub‐microscopic	 entities	was	 a	 sound	
doctrine	 those	 days”	 (1983,	 274;	 emphasis	 in	 the	 origin).	 “Assumptions	 about	 the	 minute	
structure	 of	 matter	 could	 not	 be	 proven	 then.	 The	 only	 proof	 could	 be	 indirect…	 Such	
indirectness	need	never	produce	conviction	in	the	philosopher	inclined	to	instrumentalism	or	
some	other	brand	of	idealism”	(1983,	173).		













makes	 our	minds	 feel	 good).	 Prestcott	et	al.	 don’t	 explain	phenomena	with	 electrons.	
They	know	how	to	use	them	(1983,	271‐272).	
Nevertheless,	 I	 think	the	NMA	interpretation	is	viable.	We	may	distinguish	the	type	of	
scientific	 activity	 that	 best	 supports	 the	 reality	 of	 electrons	 (theoretical	 explanation	 versus	
experimental	manipulation)	from	the	type	of	argument	Hacking	is	giving	for	their	reality	(IBE	
versus	 another	 type	 of	 argument).	 The	 explananda	 of	 scientific	 explanations	 are	 specific	


















explanans,	 and	 the	 purpose	 is	 explanation.	 Recall,	 however,	 that	 in	 this	 paper,	 I	 distinguish	
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Perhaps	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 psychology:	 maybe	 the	 very	 skills	 that	 make	 for	 a	 great	
experimenter	go	with	a	certain	cast	of	mind	that	objectifies	whatever	he	thinks	about	
(1983,	265).		
Hacking’s	 reply	 to	 this	 objection	 is	 that	 experimenters	 do	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 reality	 of	 all	
theoretical	 entities,	 only	 experimental	 entities.	 Thus	 he	 concludes	 that	 experimenters’	






the	objection	still	 stands.	A	second	problem	with	 this	 reconstruction	 is	 that	 the	 term	“we”	 is	
ambiguous.	Who	is	rationally	compelled	to	believe	in	electrons	–	only	experimenters	who	use	
them,	or	 the	 rest	 of	 us	 as	well?	 It	does	not	 follow,	 for	 instance,	 from	 the	 fact	 that	practicing	
religious	people	are	rationally	compelled	to	believe	in	God	that	everybody	else	must	also	believe	



































that	 question	 the	 aspects	 of	 reality	 that	 the	 transcendental	 arguments	 try	 to	 establish.	
Transcendental	arguments	proceed	from	their	premises	to	their	conclusion	by	the	preservation	
of	logical	or	necessary	truths	(Bardon	2006).		
Transcendental	 arguments,	 indispensability	 arguments,	 and	 IBEs	 are	 sometimes	
characterized	 as	 belonging	 to	 an	 overlapping	 family	 of	 arguments,	 since	 they	 have	 a	 similar	
structure.	Within	 this	paper,	 I	 distinguish	argument	 types	on	epistemic	grounds,	 rather	 than	
structural,	 and	want	 to	 keep	 the	 distinction	 between	 them	 clear.	 Thus,	within	 this	 family	 of	
structurally	similar	arguments,	I	call	an	“IBE”	an	argument	whose	epistemic	warrant	is	empirical,	
an	“indispensability	argument”	an	argument	whose	warrant	is	grounded	in	the	requirement	of	







electrons	 and	 other	 unobservable	 experimental	 entities	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	
possibility	 of	 the	 experimental	 practice	 in	 the	 physics	 laboratory.	Morrison	 (1990,	 17),	who	








effect	 that	 the	 preservation	 of	 reference	 of	 the	 term	 “electron”	 to	 electrons	 (or	 other	
unobservable	experimental	entities)	during	radical	theory	changes	is	a	necessary	condition	for	
the	possibility	of	the	experimental	practice	Hacking	describes.	To	understand	why	this	may	be	
so,	 recall	 the	 challenge	 that	 Kuhn	 (1970)	 presents	 to	 SR	 of	 explaining	 how	 reference	 of	






                                                 




























whether	 a	 separate	 argument	 should	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 every	 unobservable	
experimental	 entity.	 This	 is	 because	 such	 an	 argument	 must	 start	 with	 an	 uncontroversial	
description	of	an	experimental	practice	at	the	level	of	observable	entities	alone,	and	then	show	
 ‐	14	‐	
that	 some	 conclusions	 about	 unobservables	 logically	 or	 necessarily	 follow	 from	 it.	 Since	
scientists	manipulate	entities	in	many	ways	and	experimental	practice	significantly	varies,	it	is	





examples	 to	 the	 contrary.	 Morrison	 (1990,	 9‐13)	 describes	 a	 case	 in	 which	 physicists	
manipulated	quarks	to	study	charm,	while	they	were	still	not	convinced	of	the	reality	of	quarks.	
The	consistency	of	 the	data	 they	obtained	served	as	a	 retroactive	reason	 for	believing	 in	 the	
existence	 of	 both	 the	 manipulated	 and	 studied	 entities.	 For	 Morrison,	 this	 means	 that	
“manipulation	can	occur	in	context	where	there	are	no	firmly	held	beliefs	about	the	entities	being	




















warrant	 conclusions	 about	 the	 external	 world,	 since	 the	 conclusions	 should	 follow	 only	
deductively	 or	 necessarily	 (Stroud	 1968).	 Thus,	 a	 transcendental	 argument	 for	 SR	 may	 be	
criticised	on	the	grounds	that	in	principle	it	is	not	able	to	establish	conclusions	about	what	exists	
in	the	external	world,	including	unobservables.		




Within	 the	SR	 debate,	 this	 suggestion	 looks	 promising,	 because	 scientific	 antirealists	 are	not	








How	do	 the	 three	 interpretations	 of	Hacking’s	 argument	 that	 I	 reviewed	 so	 far	work	
together?	Do	they	jointly	provide	a	stronger	case	for	ER	than	each	of	them	provides	alone?		The	
first	 three	 arguments	 seem	 mutually	 consistent.	 They	 all	 accept	 the	 realist	 commitments	
enumerated	 in	 §2.	 Because	 they	 enjoy	 warrants	 of	 different	 kinds,	 they	 implicitly	 rely	 on	
different	 background	assumptions	about	what	makes	 a	 claim	 justified.	While	different,	 these	
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claims	 of	 unobservables,	 rather	 than	 adding	 an	 extra	 layer	 of	 philosophical	 analysis	 and	
argumentation	 to	 them.	Maddy	 rejects	 IBEs,	 transcendental	 arguments,	 and	 indispensability	





mind	that	 IBE	 is	a	very	common	form	of	 inference	 in	many	non‐philosophical	contexts	(Ben‐
Menahem	1990).	 I	 therefore	 believe	 that	 at	 least	 some	 IBEs	 for	 SR	 are	 in	 line	with	Maddy’s	
philosophical	 naturalism.	 If	 I	 am	 right,	 then	 a	 scientific	 realist	 who	 adheres	 to	 Maddy’s	
philosophical	methodology	might	accept	the	NMA	argument	for	ER,	but	reject	the	transcendental	
and	indispensability	arguments.		







I	 have	 so	 far	 suggested	 three	 different	 interpretations	 of	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 ER,	
which	 enjoy	 epistemic	warrants	 of	 different	 kinds.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	while	 different,	 these	
interpretations	need	not	necessarily	be	in	tension	with	each	other.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	








that	we	have	 this	kind	of	understanding	 is	 that	we	can	set	out,	 from	scratch,	 to	build	
machines	that	will	work	fairly	reliably,	taking	advantage	of	this	causal	nexus.	
This	echoes	Italian	philosopher	Vico’s	Maker’s	Theory	of	Knowledge.	Vico	(1668‐1744)	
equates	 truth	with	making	(“verum	 ipsum	 factum”),	and	argues	that	 inasmuch	as	we	produce	
something,	 we	 also	 know	 its	 causes	 and	 understand	 its	 true	 principles.	 “The	 verum‐factum	
principle	defines	knowledge	or	science	as	pre‐eminently	causal	 in	character	and	as	 therefore	
concerned	with	the	genesis	or	construction	of	a	phenomenon”	(Zagorin	1984,	18).7	
Boon	 &	 Knuuttila	 (2011)	 sympathetically	 read	 Hacking	 in	 this	 spirit.	 They	 interpret	
Hacking	 as	 claiming	 that	 a	 mere	 mirroring	 (isomorphism,	 similarity,	 etc.)	 notion	 of	
representation,	which	dominates	 the	philosophy	of	 science,	 is	 empty	without	 an	 intervening	
component.	The	epistemic	 value	of	models	 lies	 in	our	ability	 to	manipulate	 them	 for	gaining	
knowledge	about	the	world	or	use	them	to	manipulate	the	world.	Boon	&	Knuuttila	(2011,	87)	
write:	


















natural	 phenomena.	 As	 Carrier	 (2011,	 48‐52)	 argues,	 however,	 we	 nowadays	 study	 non‐
naturally	occurring	phenomena	of	our	own	making,	and	use	them	to	study	other	phenomena	as	
well.	Carrier	doubts,	however,	that	causal	manipulative	abilities	are	sufficient	for	knowledge	for	
two	 reasons.	 First,	 sometimes	 scientists	 know	 how	 to	 produce	 certain	 effects	 without	 fully	











Moreover,	 a	 Vichian	 framework	 forms	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 knowability,	 which	 seems	
incompatible	with	 the	hierarchy	assumed	within	 the	SR	debate.	Though	many	argue	 that	 the	
lines	 between	 observable	 and	 unobservable	 entities	 are	 blurry,	 it	 is	 still	 generally	 assumed	




car	 engines,	 higher	 on	 its	 epistemic	 hierarchy	 than	 non‐manipulatable	 entities,	 such	 as	
unobservable	bosons	and	observable	hurricanes.		
I	do	not	suggest	that	a	Vichian	epistemology	and	the	standard	SR	assumptions	cannot	be	

























one	hand”	and	 “here	 is	another”,	and	 then	deduces	 the	existence	of	an	external	world.	Greco	
(2002)	argues	that	the	epistemic	force	of	Moore’s	proof	does	not	lie	in	any	feature	of	Moore’s	










The	 non‐argument	 interpretation	 returns	 SR	 to	 its	 common‐sense	 roots.	 Before	 SR	
shattered	into	countless	positions	with	hair‐splitting	epistemic	and	ontic	distinctions	between	
them,	 it	was	considered	a	common‐sense	philosophy,	which	takes	our	best	science	at	 its	 face	





argue	 that	 for	experimenters	and	 those	who	study	 them,	knowledge	of	electrons	becomes	as	
commonsensical	as	knowledge	of	one’s	hands.	The	prospects	of	such	a	suggestion	need	further	
exploring.	




rest	 of	 the	 arguments	 commit	 a	 category	 mistake:	 they	 try	 to	 prove	 with	 a	 philosophical	





persuasive,	 and	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 Entity	 Realism	 seems	 simple	 and	 straightforward,	
appearances	can	be	misleading.	I	distinguished	five	possible	readings	of	Hacking’s	argument	for	
Entity	Realism	based	on	the	epistemic	rationale	that	underlies	them:	(1)	a	no‐miracles	argument,	
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